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9 
Drone Warfare and Just War Theory 
Harry van der Linden 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, have been used by the 
United States in conventional war situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Their most 
controversial purpose has been their use, especially by the Obama administration, in the 
targeted killing of suspected terrorists in non-battlefield settings, notably in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan and Yemen.
i
 Targeted killing 
of civilian “militants” can also take place through cruise missile strikes, manned 
aircrafts, and “boots on the ground” (as is illustrated by the killing of Osama bin Laden), 
but targeted killing by drones has several distinct advantages for the United States.  
Unlike targeted killing executed by counterinsurgency troops, drone targeted 
killing poses few risks to the lives of US soldiers because the teams that launch and 
recover drones are typically hundreds of miles away from the search and strike area, 
while the teams that fly the plane (consisting of a pilot and a sensor operator controlling 
the cameras), together with their supporting teams of data analysts, etc., are thousands 
of miles away in the United States, watching or searching for their target until the 
optimal moment has arrived to unleash the missiles. Moreover, drones are considerably 
cheaper strike platforms than manned aircrafts and can stay in the air much longer (over 
twenty hours). And, like cruise missiles, drones do not turn the target area into a 
battlefield where humans face one another as enemies, but they are superior to cruise 
missiles in terms of a much shorter strike time so that the killing can be executed on the 
basis of a last- moment assessment of the intended target.
ii
 Accordingly, it not surprising 
that most US targeted killings have been executed by remote-controlled aircraft.  
The targeted killings by the Obama administration show that drones enable war to 
be fought in a fundamentally new way. My main aim here is to argue that drone warfare 
poses moral problems and risks of such nature and magnitude that we should support an 
international ban on weaponized drones and, certainly, that we should seek an 
international treaty against drone systems that operate without the remote-control link; 
namely, autonomous, lethal UAVs (and killer robots in general). My argument will 
develop in two steps.  
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First, I will articulate some moral objections to drone warfare on the basis of a 
just war theory analysis of the Obama administration’s targeted killings. To make my 
analysis manageable, I will focus on the drone targeted killings executed mostly under 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supervision in the FATA, but, on the whole, the 
analysis also applies to the drone killings in Yemen.  
The CIA drone campaign in Pakistan peaked in 2010 with 128 strikes and 751 to 
1,109 “militant” and civilian casualties, and ceased as of January 2014, at the request of 
the Pakistani government in order to facilitate its peace talks with the Pakistan Taliban, 
one of the main armed groups operating in the FATA.
iii
 The respite in drone strikes 
might become permanent, but this would not signal a change in US policy because the 
drone targeted killing is ongoing in Yemen with several strikes a month in early 2014.  
Second, I will explore some additional moral objections to combat drones on the 
basis of principles of “just military preparedness” or jus ante bellum (justice before 
war), a new category of just war thinking. Let me begin by introducing traditional just 
war theory and its normative principles.  
 
 
JUST WAR THEORY 
 
Just war theory consists of a historically evolved set of normative principles for 
determining when resort to military force is just (jus ad bellum principles) and how war 
can be justly executed (jus in bello principles). The most important jus ad bellum 
principle is that war must have a just cause, i.e., a goal of a kind and weight that seems 
to make resort to military force appropriate. Further, war must be declared by a 
legitimate or right authority, and must be pursued with right intention or the just cause 
as its primary motive. The three final jus ad bellum principles are that war must be a 
last-resort measure (diplomacy and other nonviolent measures should generally be 
pursued first); that it must have a reasonable chance of success in realizing its intended 
goal; and that it must be proportional in the sense that the anticipated goods of militarily 
pursuing the just cause must be commensurate with the expected harms.  
The most essential jus in bello principle is the principle of discrimination, or 
noncombatant immunity, which requires that combatants distinguish between civilians 
and enemy combatants, and only directly attack the latter. Unintended civilian deaths 
are permitted, but due care must be taken to minimize their number, and the value of the 
military target must make it worth the civilian cost of life. There is also a separate jus in 
bello principle of micro-proportionality, stipulating that military force should be used 
economically in that the anticipated harms of a military action should not be excessive 
in proportion to its military value. Traditionally, the jus ad bellum decision was seen as 
chiefly the responsibility of political leaders, while using force in accordance with the 
jus in bello principles fell on the shoulders of soldiers. But in a modern democracy this 
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seems no longer tenable: war in all its aspects has also become the responsibility of the 
citizens, and, arguably, a volunteer army entails that soldiers also have jus ad bellum 
responsibility and should refuse to fight unjust wars or, at least, not re-enlist for them.  
The just war principles are quite broad and general, and contemporary just war 
theorists offer slightly different sets of principles, interpret the individual principles in 
dissimilar ways, and give different weight to the various principles. Thus just war 
theorists end up defending views that range from being rather bellicose and generally 
supportive of US interventionist policies, to views that are in practice close to pacifism 
and oppose most, if not all, recent US wars. Still, just war theory provides a widely 
shared moral framework for addressing new moral concerns raised by the ever-changing 
nature of warfare. This seems particularly important when the United Nations (UN) 
Charter and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (which embody many just war 
principles) may not cover new military developments and threats, such as targeted 
killing by drones in response to the dangers posed by “global terrorism.” Thus the moral 
analysis offered by just war theory may lead to a desire to revise the UN Charter and 
IHL, or may lead one to argue against misguided efforts in that direction. 
 
DRONE WARFARE AND JUS AD BELLUM 
 
In a speech at the National Defense University on May 23, 2013, President Barack 
Obama defended the targeted killings under his administration as morally and legally 
justified acts of war, as a part of a war of self-defense against al-Qaeda and its 
“associated forces” authorized by Congress in response to 9/11 in the 2001 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).
iv
 No doubt, in light of the scope and 
nature of the targeted killings executed under his authority, Obama rightly viewed them 
as acts of war rather than, say, as last-resort acts of law enforcement. But were they 
justified acts of war? Did they have a just cause? More specifically, the question is 
whether the “militants” targeted by the Obama administration’s drone killings 
constituted a clear threat against the United States of a magnitude and type such that war 
acts against them were warranted. Jeff McMahan argues that the targeted killing of 
terrorists as an act of self-defensive war is morally quite similar to the killing of 
aggressor combatants who are asleep.
v
 Aggressor combatants (who are in uniform), 
unlike civilian aggressors (“terrorists”), have a legal right to kill on the battlefield. But 
like civilian aggressors, they do not have a moral right to kill, and they intend to be 
instrumental in killing persons who have done nothing to warrant this fate. We may 
therefore kill both types of aggressors in order to prevent wrongful harm from being 
inflicted.  
This analysis provides moral support for targeted killing as an act of war only in 
terms of the type of threat that is posed. What is also required for “just cause” is that the 
threat has a magnitude large enough so that war becomes a reasonable option. After all, 
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a limited threat does not justify the initiation of war with all its inevitable, and often 
unexpected, harms. (The proportionality principle further assesses in particular cases 
whether the threat outweighs the harms involved in eliminating the threat; the just cause 
principle only requires the existence of a threat that meets the threshold of a serious 
threat.)  
Moreover, it is only when the threat to a political community is very substantive 
that we may adopt the morally deeply-disconcerting war standard of killing on the basis 
of hostile status (as happens in drone strikes) in addition to the commonly accepted 
standard of killing in strict self-defense. Similarly, the threat must be great to warrant 
the adoption of a less strict standard in war than in law enforcement for avoiding the 
unintentional killing of non-hostile civilians. Typically, terrorists lack the weaponry, the 
organization, and the number of participants for meeting the threat threshold of just 
cause, and in that case civilian aggressors should be approached as very dangerous 
criminals who should be arrested, extradited if needed, and who may only be killed or 
incapacitated when they use lethal force or seek to escape. The horrific events of 9/11, 
however, gave credibility to the idea that al-Qaeda posed a danger that went above the 
threshold necessary for war. To be sure, the virtually unanimous support for war at the 
time might have been rooted more in retributive feelings than in the conviction that war 
was necessary to prevent large-scale future harms. But this only shows that the 
understanding of war as punishment, rejected by most modern just war theorists, is still 
prevalent.
vi
   
 Credible just war thinking must see war as not only in need of justification at the 
point of its initiation, but should also assess its continuation and its various stages on the 
basis of jus ad bellum principles (i.e., we should temporalize the principles).
vii
 The Bush 
administration initiated a conflict in Pakistan (beyond the conflict in Afghanistan) with 
the targeted killing of civilian “militants” in the FATA. Obama hugely stepped up these 
killings immediately after his inauguration in 2009: about 85 percent of around 380 
strikes in Pakistan were performed under Obama’s orders.viii Did this new campaign 
have a just cause? By 2009, the case that al-Qaeda constituted a threat serious enough to 
qualify as a just cause had greatly weakened. Surely, no major attacks had been 
launched or plotted against the United States after 9/11 that gave credibility to the view 
that law-enforcement measures would be largely inadequate to meet future al-Qaeda 
threats. Moreover, the war in Afghanistan had weakened al-Qaeda in this region and led 
to its dispersal to other countries. It may also be noted that other countries that suffered 
from horrendous terrorist attacks in the years after 2001, such as Indonesia (Bali 
bombing in 2002) and Spain (Madrid bombing in 2004), had not moved away from the 
law-enforcement model.  
The Obama administration has never really tried to make the case that its drone 
killings in Pakistan were justified in terms of self-defense, since it executed these 
killings largely in secrecy. The only data we have about the number of strikes and  
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people killed have been tabulated by civilian groups, based on reports by local 
individuals, government officials, and journalists in a region with rather limited access. 
This lack of transparency violates the requirements of the principle of legitimate 
authority. Congress failed in its responsibility as legitimate authority when it authorized 
the president, in the AUMF, to use US armed forces against any state, organization, or 
person linked to 9/11. Obama exploited this extremely open-ended authorization in his 
approval of greatly expanding US targeted killing in Pakistan, sidestepping the fact that 
the CIA is not part of the “armed forces.” It should also be noted that the AUMF only 
authorized the president to take action against people connected to 9/11, not those 
suspected of other terrorist actions. The principle of legitimate authority demands full 
transparency (rather than limited reporting to some members of Congress) because it is 
only on the basis of debate and access to all facts that a body representing the people 
can declare war, as a communal enterprise, in the name of the people. The same can be 
said of new stages of development in a continuing war. Remarkably, it was not until 
early 2012 that Obama for the first time publicly discussed his drone program, and 
Congress has still not demanded a tally of the number of civilian and militant casualties 
in US targeted killings.
ix
  
Secrecy has also enabled the Obama administration to violate the principle of 
right intention in its targeted killing campaign in Pakistan. Even though the killings 
were justified as self-defense, they must have served other goals. Notably, in drone 
strikes on Pakistan during the Obama administration, fewer than 10 percent of the 
identified targets were directed against al-Qaeda, and less than 2 percent of all 
“militants” killed were named leaders of al-Qaeda or other targeted organizations.x In 
short, it seems that the militants killed were mostly low-level insurgents with local aims 
(such as members of the Pakistan Taliban), and most strikes were not aimed at named 
individuals (so-called personality strikes) but rather at individuals who fit the profile of 
a militant (so-called signature strikes). The US goals (other than self-defense) seem to 
have been to weaken the FATA as a basis of support for the Afghanistan Taliban and to 
assist the Pakistani government in its struggle with various armed opposition groups, 
such as the Pakistan Taliban, in the FATA. More broadly, the United States seems to 
have been guided by the motive of maintaining, and even extending, its role as global 
military hegemon. I will later suggest that the United States morally erred in pursuing 
these goals; what matters now is to note that the goals show a lack of “right intention” 
behind the Obama administration’s drone killings.   
The various violations of the first three jus ad bellum principles by the targeted 
killings in Pakistan point to several moral dangers of drone warfare. It is easy to use 
drones for preventing threats or harms that remain under the threshold of just cause, 
since drone warfare poses few risks for those who execute it, at least in asymmetric 
conflicts. And what greatly adds to this danger is that active public support is not 
needed to execute drone warfare, and that this type of war, accordingly, can easily be 
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undertaken largely in secret without proper authorization and public debate, even in an 
“open” society.   
Moreover, drone warfare makes it easy to pursue goals that are different from the 
stated goal of security that generally appeals to the public. Thus drone warfare seems to 
be thus far the best enabler of war as “alienated war,” that is, war as a collective activity 
that no longer requires public sacrifice and moral commitment.
xi
 The volunteer army, 
the use of private military contractors, the technology of precision bombs, and, now, 
drone warfare, are all steps toward normalizing war for US citizens: war no longer feels 
like war, it no longer disrupts everyday life, and, so, war becomes acceptable. Long-
term “boots on the ground,” even if they are the boots of volunteers, threatens this 
normalization, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated, but there is no such 
time-limit problem in drone warfare. Combat drones also have been proven to be very 
effective in conventional wars, as illustrated by the war in Libya. No troops on the 
ground were necessary for “success” in that war, and this played a role in President 
Obama simply announcing this war, rather than seeking public approval and 
congressional authorization. Drone warfare, then, as almost risk-free war for US 
soldiers, minimizes the number of occasions that the public is left wondering whether 
war and the United States playing “global cop” is worth the sacrifices of its soldiers. 
With drone warfare, the public is left free to admire the military in a cultural sort of way 
only (video games, technological awe, “support the troops,” parades, etc.), while the 
government is left free to pursue its political and military interests.  
Drone warfare shields the US public from the reality of war, but war is still very 
real at the receiving end. The buzz of the combat drones is heard overhead for hours on 
end in Pakistan, leaving the local people in enduring states of deep fear since the 
missiles could strike at any moment. And the strikes wreak human devastation: the total 
casualties (from 2004–2013) are between 2,296 and 3,719; the non-hostile civilian 
casualties are between 416 and 957, including as many as 202 children. Another 1,089 
to 1,639 people have been injured.
xii
  
Other costs of the drone strikes were that Pakistan’s sovereignty has been violated 
and that the strikes have led to growing resentment among the Pakistani people against 
the United States. Moreover, the strikes created fertile recruiting grounds in the FATA 
for new civilian aggressors and set a bad precedent for future targeted killing campaigns 
by other countries. It seems that all these costs could reasonably have been foreseen 
when the drone campaign in Pakistan was expanded in 2009, and so it should have been 
clear to the Obama administration that the campaign, with its uncertain and limited 
threat prevention impact, would violate the proportionality principle. And, surely, the 
more these costs have become impossible to ignore in subsequent years, the stronger the 
case has become in terms of proportionality considerations that the campaign has to 
stop. 
 
175 
 
 
The Obama administration, however, claimed that its drone strikes did not violate 
Pakistan’s sovereignty because that government permitted the strikes. This defense has 
merit but is ultimately not convincing. A visible sign of Pakistan’s permission, at least 
in the early years of the Obama drone attacks, is that the CIA launched drones not only 
from Afghanistan but also from Shamsi air base in Pakistan (the United States was 
evicted from the base in December 2011).
xiii
 Similarly, we may see the fact that the 
Pakistani government claimed responsibility for some drone strikes prior to 2008 as 
reflective of its permission.
xiv
 We should ask, though, how did Pakistan’s permission 
came about? Was it the result of undue political pressure and conditional financial and 
military aid promised by the United States, or was it significantly the outcome of the 
Pakistani government’s desire to combat (with US assistance) the growing oppositional 
violence and flagrant human rights violations by the Pakistan Taliban and other militant 
groups in the FATA? Similarly, it is unclear what we should make of the Pakistani 
government’s frequent public protests against the US drone strikes. Did the protests 
reflect genuine concerns about violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty, or were they mostly 
attempts to pacify the growing strong public opposition among the Pakistani people to 
the strikes? So, at least, the claim that the United States did not violate the sovereignty 
of the Pakistani government (state) is questionable.  
But the real issue at stake is sovereignty in a broader sense, the sovereignty of the 
people of Pakistan, and here the picture is much clearer: the majority of the Pakistani 
people have consistently opposed drone strikes, even if the strikes were presented (in 
polls) as necessary to reduce militant violence against Pakistani citizens.
xv
 The obvious 
lesson is that most Pakistanis thought (and still think) that oppositional violence in their 
country is their battle to fight, and for good reason. US intervention has served as a 
destabilizing force and even might have fueled the flames of the violent opposition, 
exploiting anger at the “untouchability” of US military force and its arrogance of 
engaging in widespread killing in “secret.” Likewise, the United States had no right to 
extend its war in Afghanistan to Pakistan in order to address its failure to prevent al-
Qaeda and many Afghanistan Taliban fighters from making the FATA their new staging 
ground after the war was “won” in Afghanistan.  
The Obama administration’s drone killings violate the last resort principle. 
Alternatives, whether in the form of negotiations or law-enforcement measures, do not 
seem to have been considered. In fact, a remarkable feature of the Obama 
administration’s counterterrorism strategy is that no prisoners are taken, and thus the 
problem so central to the Bush administration of how to treat captured suspected 
terrorists is largely avoided. It is certainly ironic that in the same year Obama reached 
out to the Islamic world and received the Nobel Peace Prize, he also greatly stepped up 
the drone strikes in the FATA. The brief hope for a more multilateral and cooperative 
American  foreign policy was betrayed in secret by a continuation of the usual 
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militarized foreign policy, clouding the prospect of finding enduring solutions for 
terrorism. Thus the principle of reasonable chance of success was also violated, because 
military force in accordance with this principle must lead to long-term threat reduction. 
The drone strikes in the FATA might have reduced some threats posed by al-Qaeda for 
the United States, but at the cost of worsening the economic and political conditions in 
the area and so inducing new threats in the long run, especially for the Pakistani people. 
Generally, militarized foreign policy errs in thinking that war is the answer; it fails to 
recognize that military force, at best, can bring people to the point of renewing 
cooperative efforts and finding nonviolent, enduring solutions for what gave rise to 
violent conflict in the first place.  
These violations of the final three jus ad bellum principles further underline how 
drone warfare enables “alienated” war. Since targeted killing by drones does not place 
US soldiers in the areas under attack, it seems that sovereignty is not violated and that 
no war has been waged against the Pakistani people. Drone strikes, in other words, 
appear to eliminate only “terrorists” from afar, and drones, touted as very precise 
weapons,
xvi
 can carefully excise this evil. With this mode of thought, the very fact that 
drones have been harming the Pakistani people has remained largely outside the US 
national discourse, and there were no US soldiers on the ground to report otherwise and 
bring stories home of great human suffering. Our news about drones at war is not the 
news of a country at war; at most, drone strikes are reported in the sidelines with the 
number of estimated terrorists killed and the occasional mention of civilians who also 
may have died. “Alienated” war is war for which people do not take full responsibility, 
and combat drones facilitate this denial of responsibility.   
 
DRONE WARFARE AND JUS IN BELLO 
Granted that the Obama drone campaign in the FATA was unjust in jus ad bellum 
terms, it follows that all US drone killings during this campaign were wrongful killings, 
and that the just course of action would have been to request Pakistan to arrest all those 
civilian militants against whom US courts would have a legal case. No doubt, this 
would have been a tall order and success might have been limited, even if the Pakistani 
government would have accepted US assistance. But justice comes with a price, and the 
moral costs of drone killings as the alternative were much greater. Still, it remains 
important to address the wrongful drone killings in jus in bello terms, both in order to 
rebut the Obama administration’s view that the drone strikes were justly executed and to 
point out jus in bello moral dangers of drone warfare in general. Limited data and the 
scope of this chapter make it impossible to assess individual drone attacks, but the 
aggregate data allow for jus in bello assessment of the Pakistani drone campaign over 
the years.  
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The United States has frequently executed several missile strikes in short 
succession on the same target in the FATA with the result that responders to the first 
strike, such as rescue workers and family members, were killed.
xvii
 This policy violates 
the principle of discrimination or noncombatant immunity because it reflects lack of due 
care in seeking to minimize civilian casualties; worse even, it suggests the intentional 
killing of civilians, a war crime. Besides requiring due care, the principle of 
discrimination also demands that the civilian costs of individual strikes are not 
excessive in light of the military value of the strikes. The percentage of civilians killed 
was approximately 22 percent in 2009, 11 percent in 2010, 14 percent in 2011, 7 percent 
in 2012, and as low as 0 percent in 2013.
xviii
 Is this range of killing civilians 
proportionate?  
How do you decide this question? A recent defender of the drone strikes suggests 
that “we can compare the number of civilians that targets are killing and the number of 
civilians killed in the targeting to see which number is bigger.”xix Noting that al-Qaeda 
(and its affiliates) had been responsible for over 4,400 civilian deaths throughout the 
years and that at most 700 civilians had been killed in Pakistan (through 2011), this 
supporter of drone strikes concludes that the civilian deaths in Pakistan were clearly not 
excessive. I have already pointed out the flaw in this reasoning: the total number of 
civilians killed by al-Qaeda is as such not an adequate reflection of the threat level 
posed by this group in 2009, when Obama stepped up the drone warfare in Pakistan. 
Certainly, there is no evidence to support the notion that the drone campaign against al-
Qaeda has saved the lives of even remotely as many US civilians as the number of 
Pakistani civilians killed during this campaign. Proportionality seems to demand that the 
estimated number of saved lives should be much higher.
xx
  
Another argument to the effect that the civilian-killing percentage of the drone 
warfare in Pakistan was acceptable is that alternative military strategies, such as putting 
boots on the ground, would have led to greater numbers of civilians killed.
xxi
 Generally, 
it might be true that non-drone counterterrorism operations may result in more civilian 
deaths—soldiers, for example, may be more discriminate than drones (they know who 
shoots at them), but more civilians might be caught in crossfire in a ground battle. But 
one cannot conclude that since one operational strategy brings fewer civilian deaths than 
another that, therefore, this strategy has an acceptable rate of civilian deaths. After all, 
the other strategy might be grossly disproportionate. At best, the comparative 
proportionality advantage of drone warfare helps to explain why drone warfare is a 
preferred US option. It also might be a factor in the United States opting for drone 
warfare in regions where it would not use traditional conventional military force.  
Officials of the Obama administration have regularly emphasized that combat 
drones are very accurate weapons and so lead to very minimal civilian deaths. Former 
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defense secretary Leon Panetta, for example, claimed in 2011 that drones “are probably 
the most precise weapons in the history of warfare.”xxii However, the very fact that 
drone technology has accurate capabilities in terms of identifying its target and then 
striking the target with a limited blast area does not mean that due care is taken to avoid 
civilian casualties. The fact that the number of civilian casualties decreased greatly the 
more drone warfare in Pakistan was protested and subjected to public scrutiny suggests 
that the capability of technological accuracy in the early years of the Obama drone 
campaign in Pakistan went hand in hand with a lack of “moral accuracy.” Relatedly, 
precision in finding and hitting the target does not imply that there is precision in the 
selection of the target.
xxiii
  
The Obama administration’s process of naming the militants it puts on its killing 
lists is shrouded in secrecy and might not be very reliable. Flawed intelligence may lead 
to misidentification of civilians as hostile militants. It also should be noted that there is 
no general agreement on the criteria  for determining the hostile status of civilians in the 
first place. The bomb maker of al-Qaeda is a threat, but what about the propaganda 
maker, the paid armed chauffeur, or a seemingly inactive member? The little we know 
about the identities of “militants” killed by the Obama administration suggests that it 
adheres to a rather broad understanding of what counts as being militant. Signature 
strikes, with their vague killing standard of “fitting the profile of hostile militants,” add 
greatly to the problem that many people killed might have been misidentified or 
mischaracterized. Accordingly, the Obama administration’s claim of limited unintended 
civilian deaths, even if taken at face value, is misleading in that drone strikes may have 
killed many people conceived of as militants who were actually civilians. Even the data 
gathered by various civilian groups might over-report the number of genuine militants, 
since often the only evidence for claiming that the casualties were militants is the 
reporting by “anonymous Pakistani officials,” presumably army officials with an 
interest in having broad standards of militancy and pleasing the US military.
xxiv
 Thus the 
unintended civilian deaths of the drone campaign in Pakistan might be considerably 
greater than the mere numbers or percentages of “civilians killed” suggest, so that the 
campaign, even in its later years, might have been to some degree disproportionate.  
 The principle of micro-proportionality prohibits excessive use of force, taking 
into consideration both civilian and militant casualties. Based on the assumption that the 
goal of the drone campaign in Pakistan was to eliminate threats posed by al-Qaeda, 
signature strikes violate this principle because, surely, there was no way of telling 
whether an individual who fit the profile of “militant” belonged to al-Qaeda or some 
other militant group. Moreover, since, as previously noted, less than 10 percent of all 
drone strikes in Pakistan (during the Obama administration) were specifically directed 
against al-Qaeda, military force was used excessively in terms of the stated goal of 
combatting “global terrorism” because no attempt was made to avoid the killing of 
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militants with local aims only, and their deaths had only marginal value with respect to 
the goal of weakening al-Qaeda.   
In sum, all the praise of combat drones as very precise killing machines obscures 
difficult moral problems of setting (and executing) morally convincing standards for 
determining the hostile status of civilians and of deciding what counts as 
disproportionate civilian deaths. Similar problems also emerge with regard to defining 
military targets in civilian settings. Technological accuracy lulls people into thinking 
that “moral accuracy” has been reached, making drone warfare a more acceptable form 
of warfare. What further enables the comfort of drone warfare as “alienated war” is that 
US military superiority leaves people unconcerned that drone warfare brings war home 
in a manner that raises significant jus in bello concerns: military drone pilots are 
combatants during their working hours on their base and they “hide” their combatant 
status after work when they mix into the civilian population and return home. Moreover, 
the CIA agents who assist in drone strikes are civilians who help to kill civilian militants 
who are blamed for hiding their hostile intentions.
xxv
  
 
TARGETED KILLING: BETWEEN WAR AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
In his speech at the National Defense University, Obama not only defended his drone 
warfare record, but he also looked at the future of the war against global terrorism.
xxvi
 
He said: “America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this 
struggle, or else it will define us. We have to be mindful of James Madison’s warning 
that ‘No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.’” More 
specifically, Obama reiterated his commitment to bring the troops home from 
Afghanistan and proposed that we no longer define US counterterrorism as a “global 
war on terror,” but rather “as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific 
networks of violent extremists that threaten America.” These “targeted efforts” foremost 
refer to drone strikes, and, apparently, Obama seems to think that the continuation of 
targeted killing strikes, at a reduced rate thanks to “the progress we’ve made against 
core al-Qaeda,” is no longer really war. Correspondingly, he said that he would like 
Congress and the American people to engage “in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, 
the AUMF’s mandate.”  
Concomitant with the speech at National Defense University, the White House 
released a fact sheet,
xxvii
 outlining standards (taken from a classified Presidential Policy 
Guidance on targeted killing) for how to use lethal force against terrorists in countries 
where the United States is not at war.  In short, the standards permit a drone attack 
against a terrorist only if capture is not feasible, local authorities will not or cannot take 
effective measures to deal with the “imminent threat to U.S. persons,” and there is “near 
certainty that the terrorist target is present” and “near certainty that non-combatants will 
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not be injured or killed.” The “fact sheet” maintains that the standards “are either 
already in place or will be transitioned into place.” 
 What are we to make of these standards and the proclaimed “end” of the war on 
terror? It is clear that the standards have not been fully implemented in the ongoing 
drone war in Yemen, but then an Obama administration spokesperson said in April 
2014, almost a year after the first announcement of the new standards, that “I’m not 
going to speculate on how long the transition [toward the new standards] will take, but 
we’re going to ensure that it’s done right and not rushed.”xxviii The “end” of the war on 
terror and the new standards are attempts to normalize war and so ensure that war 
remains “alienated war.” By emphasizing that the continuation of drone killings of 
civilian militants is not a continuation of the “war on terror” and can be done with a 
refinement or even repeal of the AUMF, Obama seems to want the American public to 
accept a permanent war that is no longer called war. And, of course, the legal 
restrictions of the homeland security state, so typical of being at war, will largely remain 
in effect. What the Obama administration also seems to be doing is to push targeted 
killings by drones in the direction of a hybrid model of the war and law-enforcement 
legal models of the use of force, following the example of the Bush administration’s 
hybrid treatment of captured terrorists. Targeted killing by drones might not meet the 
level of intensity of conflict to be legally counted as war (it is “force away from hot 
battlefields”), but it still uses force in a manner typical of war, that is, hostile status 
killing (with some fine-tuning perhaps in terms of the scope of acceptable civilian 
deaths). And so a hybrid model might give greater respectability to US targeted killing 
by drones, avoiding censure that might come from either the war model or law-
enforcement model of the use of force. Further, combat drones, it is widely admitted, do 
not meet legal obstacles as such when used in conventional war theaters. Thus, we 
would be led toward a world in which drone warfare would be the new legal “normal,” 
both in international conflicts and armed conflicts with non-state actors. Would a just 
military and society want such a world? 
 
COMBAT DRONES, KILLER ROBOTS, AND JUS ANTE BELLUM 
Just war theorists tend to look at each war as a separate moral event, paying little 
attention to the fact that how we prepare for war has a great impact on how likely it is 
that war will be justly initiated and executed. To address this shortcoming I have 
articulated in some prior essays a new category of just war thinking, “just military 
preparedness,” with principles that set forth requirements for the military as a just 
institution.
xxix
 In line with the commonly used naming of the other just war theory 
categories, the new category may be called jus potentia ad bellum or, more briefly (but 
less accurately), jus ante bellum. Just military preparedness addresses two justice 
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concerns. First, it raises questions about whether the military preparation of a country 
is just toward its military personnel, places a fair burden on the civilian population, and 
the like. Second, it raises questions about whether the military preparation of a country 
is such that it is conducive to the country resorting to force only when justice is on its 
side and to executing war justly. The ultimate concern of jus ante bellum as part of just 
war theory is military preparedness that is just in the second sense, but justice in the 
first sense must also be addressed since it impacts the possibility of justice in the 
second sense. In what follows, I will discuss five jus ante bellum principles, 
emphasizing the first two principles since they have the greatest bearing on the 
question of whether a just military would want to include drones in its preparation for 
the possibility of war.  
The first principle says that the basic defense structure of a country should 
accord with its general purpose of using military force only for the sake of protecting 
people against extensive basic human rights violations caused by large-scale armed 
violence. This principle of “just purpose” requires that a country is able to meet acts of 
aggression and has the capacity to contribute to the collective tasks of assisting other 
countries in their self-defense and preventing humanitarian catastrophes caused by 
armed force (humanitarian intervention). The United States, with its relentless pursuit 
of military superiority, its professional army of around 1.4 million active duty 
personnel, its “empire of bases,”xxx and its military expenditures close to 50 percent of 
global military spending and five times the size of the second-largest spender (China), 
is in clear violation of this principle. The US military does not seek capability of self-
defense and global security through collective efforts, but rather aims at military 
hegemony and global “power” projection to serve its political and economic needs. 
The first principle requires that new military technology is introduced only if 
it is necessary for, or conducive to, the global protection of basic human rights. In 
the past, new military technology has often been developed by a party in order to 
gain advantage in a conflict that otherwise could not have been won or only won at 
very great human costs. But this does not describe how during the past few decades 
the United States has introduced new military technology. The main motivations 
behind its continuous military technological innovations seem to be the desire to 
maintain military superiority and dominance and to satisfy huge financial interests at 
stake in the research, development, production, and sale of new weapons. The 
introduction of combat drones illustrates this point. Drone warfare extends the 
global reach of US military power, and major weapon industries are increasingly 
investing in further developing and producing combat drones. A recent report for 
Congress, for example, projects that the Department of Defense will spend around 
$13 billion on the Reaper, the current combat drone of choice in targeted killing, 
between 2011 and 2020.
xxxi
 Now the problem with new military technologies is that 
they tend to spread to other countries, and this is certainly happening with combat 
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drones. Thus we may fairly soon live in a world in which a significant number of 
countries (e.g., China, Russia, India, and Iran) will use combat drones in war zones 
as well as nonwar zones and engage in the targeted killing of their “terrorists,” their 
militants seeking secession, etc. This danger of a highly destabilized world with 
military violence exercised by many countries outside their borders and off the 
battlefield is a clearly foreseeable risk. So, had the US military been just in terms of 
military preparedness, it would not have introduced combat drones. 
Some recent defenders of combat drones have argued that they might actually 
be used in the service of protecting human rights. The basic argument is that 
countries such as the United States with a low tolerance for casualties among its 
troops might use drones to execute humanitarian interventions it would otherwise 
not have executed for being too risky to the troops.
xxxii
 Here the argument that 
combat drones make war too easy is turned around: it is a good thing that it becomes 
easier to intervene in unfolding humanitarian crises. And the punch line is that 
“humanitarian drones” were already very effective in the “humanitarian 
intervention” in Libya, and that future “ground drones” (remote-controlled mobile 
strike platforms) would be of even greater assistance in meeting humanitarian 
goals.
xxxiii
  
One problem with this argument is that most of what happened in Libya was 
not a humanitarian intervention in accordance with U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1973,
xxxiv
 but rather NATO choosing a side in a civil war and actively 
supporting the overthrow of Qaddafi. Another problem is that it is unclear how 
combat drones could effectively protect populations under threat and actually stop 
génocidaires in their tracks. What seems more plausible is that killing from above 
would fan the flames on the killing fields. Similarly, drones on the ground would not 
seem particularly effective in defusing human hatred in action. A much better 
alternative is to create a permanent rapid intervention force under UN authority, 
specially trained for peacekeeping and dealing with violent humanitarian conflicts 
and composed of soldiers from across the globe. This would avoid reinforcing the 
role of the United States as military hegemon and it would make addressing 
humanitarian crises a collective responsibility, not requiring US soldiers alone to 
risk their lives.  
Combat drones are quite vulnerable to attack from modern air-defense 
systems, and so the United States is developing stealth drones and drones with air-
to-air attack abilities. Especially noteworthy is the stealth X-47B with its ability to 
land and take off from aircraft carriers.
xxxv
 It has a much larger flying range than 
current weaponized UAVs and it can fly itself. So the future seems to be that US 
combat drones will be used in more conflicts, will begin to replace even the most 
advanced manned aircrafts, and can reach all the corners of the world. Also, the X-
47B points to a future where the human role is limited to overriding the decisions of 
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unmanned killing systems, as a step toward fully autonomous systems where 
humans are taken out of the loop altogether, and the killer robots “select” their own 
targets and “decide” on their own when to pull the trigger. Generally, drone pilots 
and sensors have limitations of concentration, duration, and processing data, and so 
there is a push toward taking them out of the loop or at least limiting their role. 
Other developments in the US military pipeline include the miniaturization of UAVs 
(micro killer drones), drones operating in swarms, and weaponized underwater 
unmanned vehicles (UUVs).   
The move toward autonomous lethal systems, or “killer robots,” in the air, on 
the ground, or undersea will further increase some of the moral dangers noted with 
regard to remote-control killing. The threshold for resorting to force will be further 
lowered because the risks to soldiers will be further minimized. The illusion that 
borders can be crossed without violation of sovereignty will become even more 
compelling, and political leaders will be even less inclined to seek public 
authorization for war. Robotic warfare is also likely to strengthen war as alienated 
war for those who have the robots on their side. Robots seem to promise security 
without human costs; no tears need be shed over fallen robots. But, here again, we 
must wonder what would happen if other countries catch up with the United States, 
or even surpass it in killer robot innovations. Robotic killers have neither loyalty nor 
mercy and will kill for all who can afford them, the just and unjust alike, including 
non-state actors. Their presence will be a great threat to human rights unless one 
assumes that in the future all centers of political and economic power somehow 
miraculously coalesce with all the centers of justice, leaving robots only to fight 
unjust militants at the periphery. More likely, it will be a world of extreme 
asymmetric warfare, in which robots fight civilian militants who in some cases 
rightfully and other cases wrongfully refuse to obey the policies of the controllers of 
the killer robots. Ironically, in a world in which there is a diminishing number of 
human soldiers to fight, militant civilians might increasingly turn in desperation to 
attacking civilians under the protection of killer robots.  
The second jus ante bellum principle—the moral competency and autonomy 
principle—demands that military personnel be educated and trained with the just 
purpose of resort to force (articulated in the first principle) in mind, and be treated as 
morally competent and autonomous agents. Part of the rationale of this principle is 
that it is deeply immoral to turn soldiers into mere instruments of the state, deny 
them the opportunity to exercise their jus ad bellum responsibility, and let them pay 
the moral and psychological costs of coming to reject a war through the experience 
of fighting the war. All too often soldiers come to regret their participation in war. 
Yet, it does not seem to be the case that the US military is encouraging any 
independent jus ad bellum thinking among its troops or even officers.
xxxvi
 The 
second principle further requires that combatants are trained to become experts in 
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protecting human rights, and this includes, but is not limited to, taking on jus in 
bello responsibility. The US military is somewhat more successful in training its 
soldiers in jus in bello responsibility, partly because the changed nature of warfare, 
notably counterinsurgency by US ground troops in Iraq and especially Afghanistan, 
has necessitated better training in this regard: military success requires winning the 
hearts and minds of local civilian populations. Nevertheless, there are many 
documented instances of the commission of war crimes by US forces.
xxxvii
  
Drone warfare is likely to have some eroding impact on soldiers taking on jus 
ad bellum responsibility and strictly adhering to jus in bello norms. The justice of 
their war should be of equal concern to remote-control soldiers and soldiers on the 
physical battlefield. But remote-control soldiers have a reduced incentive to ponder 
the issue since they are not risking their lives as are the traditional soldiers. 
Moreover, since drone operators are not directly experiencing the consequences of 
their actions, they are less likely to come to question whether justice is indeed on 
their side. Also, unlike traditional soldiers, drone soldiers cannot get feedback from 
enemy soldiers or local civilians that might lead them to address jus ad bellum 
issues.  
With regard to jus in bello norms, killing in a remote-controlled way seems to 
invite less due care in trying to avoid violating these norms because one can 
experience the harm that one has caused only in a mediated way. To be sure, 
remote-control killers, like killers on the physical battlefield, see the harm they have 
caused—and PTSD has been reported among drone operators.xxxviii But it is also the 
case that the drone killers are only watching a monitor, that they watch without 
being seen, that they do not hear the sounds of suffering, and that they watch with 
others, and all these features seem to create emotional distance and with it moral 
distance and greater risk of moral indifference.
xxxix
 What seems to add to the 
unreality of the harm and the risk of moral sliding is that the mediated battlefield 
experience is an interruption of everyday life with family, driving to and from work, 
and so on.  
Even if one were to conclude that drone warfare as such is not likely to have 
some erosive moral impact on a military that seeks to adhere to moral standards, there 
is still the problem that effective drone operators may simply be skilled gamers who 
think flying a drone is a cool video game. The drone soldiers do not need courage; 
they do not need to feel a loyalty to fellow soldiers or country that requires them to be 
prepared to risk their lives; they do not have to face their victims and confront the fact 
that the video game is not really a game; and they do not even have to be paid very 
well (say, as compared to mercenaries, who risk their lives but fight without political 
allegiance). In short, drone warfare enables war to be partly executed by human 
agents who are the very opposite of the human agents who may justifiably use force 
according to the second jus ante bellum principle: agents committed to protecting 
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human rights and using force only for the sake of this purpose. For a just military, the 
fact that flying drones might be outsourced to skilled gamers with no concern for 
protecting human rights would be an additional reason not to embrace drone warfare.   
Combat drones operative in war zones do not seem to pose direct moral 
problems for soldiers on the ground as long as a clear command structure is in place. 
However, once drones morph into autonomous lethal systems, this will change. When 
human soldiers and killer robots fight side by side, the robots will place significant 
limits on the scope of decision making of human soldiers, and the human soldiers 
may be helpless to prevent situations when robots malfunction, misjudge a threat, use 
excessive force, or violate the laws of war. And, these jus in bello violations may also 
emerge when robots fight on their own in both war and non-war zones. Proponents of 
fully autonomous killing systems have argued that such problems can be 
circumvented by designing killer robots so that jus in bello constraints are integrated 
into their artificial intelligence. Even better, they argue, killer robots lack emotions of 
anger and hatred that may lead human soldiers to commit jus in bello crimes. In 
response, it should be noted that it is doubtful that machines will any time soon, if 
ever, have the capacity to act in accordance with the laws of war, and so there is the 
definite danger that killer robots will be developed and used that fall significantly 
short in this regard. Moreover, why should we assume that all militaries would even 
want to build these constraints into their killer robots? To be sure, unjust militaries 
may also use and train rogue soldiers, but unlike rogue killer robots, most human 
killers have some emotive resistance to killing that may at least offer some protection 
for non-hostile civilians, surrendering combatants, and the like.
xl
        
The third principle of just military preparedness—the principle of priority to 
nonviolence—demands that preference be given to nonmilitary means of preventing 
extensive basic human rights violations caused by armed force. In theory, the Obama 
administration seems to agree with this principle and the criticism it implies with 
regard to US military preparation. In his speech at the National Defense University, 
Obama said: “[F]oreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to 
our national security. And it’s fundamental to any sensible long-term strategy to 
battle extremism. Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend 
fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent.”xli Similarly, Obama’s first 
defense secretary, Robert M. Gates, argued for a “balanced strategy,” noting that 
there is a definite misbalance in US spending on the “war on terror” because “over 
the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory.” He 
continued, “Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be 
subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs 
that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, 
from whom the terrorists recruit.”xlii  
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In practice, however, the Obama administration has done little to bring US 
military preparation closer to satisfying the third jus ante bellum principle. The State 
Department/USAID budget, which also includes billions of dollars in military 
assistance, has been flat under the Obama administration after significant increases 
during the Bush administration, and has been consistently less than 10 percent of the 
Department of Defense budget (which in itself is considerably less than total US 
military spending). In short, the Obama administration’s foreign policy is 
thoroughly militarized, and this supports my earlier argument that it is implausible 
to see the drone warfare in Pakistan as satisfying the jus ad bellum principle of last 
resort. More broadly, as long as the United States spends so little on foreign aid, 
diplomacy, peace education, arms control, refugee assistance, and the numerous 
nonmilitary programs of the United Nations as compared to its military spending, 
we have good reason to doubt that any future US war will satisfy the principle of 
last resort. 
The fourth jus ante bellum principle—the principle of proper balance of 
values and resource allocation—requires that the value of security (against the threat 
of widespread basic human rights violations by armed force) and the resources 
committed to this value are carefully balanced against other values that good 
government should promote (e.g., education and health) and the resources set aside 
for their realization. US governments after World War II have consistently violated 
this principle by disproportionate military spending, and one enabling factor has 
been to stoke the flames of fear, from exaggerating the threat of communism to 
exaggerating the threat of terrorism. Surely, if, say, 50 percent of the money spent 
on the war on terrorism would have been spent on improving traffic safety, 
preventive health care, cancer research, and a cleaner environment, many more 
human life years in the United States would have been saved than this war, even on 
the most fantastic threat assumptions, ever could have prevented.
xliii
 Moreover, the 
money so spent would have enhanced the quality of life for millions of Americans. 
But the politics of fear sells. Politicians, the military brass, weapons producers, and 
many research scientists profit from the “military-industrial complex.” And the 
“empire of bases” guarantees access to essential material resources. All these 
interests are extraneous to the concern of having a military for protecting human 
rights, and they cast into doubt the jus ad bellum required “right intention” behind 
any (future) US interventions.  
  Military research and development (R&D) may have significant civilian 
payoffs. For example, the civilian drone industry is expected to boom in the coming 
years, and the current R&D in robotic warfare systems may sooner or later also 
bring considerable civilian benefits. This very fact, however, does not mean that the 
typically more than 50 percent of the government-supported R&D spent on defense 
is not a violation of the fourth jus ante bellum principle. For one thing, the road 
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through military R&D to various civilian applications is an indirect one, and so it is 
a road that costs much more in terms of human resources and talent than it would 
had the civilian products been pursued directly. For another thing, we cannot assume 
that the civilian payoffs of military R&D always match with items high on our 
civilian R&D lists. Relatedly, the argument that military spending is good for the 
economy fails. Military production comparatively creates few jobs, and so we would 
create many more employment opportunities by, say, investing in mass transit or 
installing solar panels than by manufacturing combat drones.
xliv
   
The fifth and final jus ante bellum principle—the principle of competent and 
right authority—demands that matters of military preparedness be settled by a 
recognized authority competent to make such decisions, with the right intention, 
aiming for just military preparedness rather than extraneous interests. In a 
democratic society, the representatives of the people should be this competent and 
right authority, requiring them to communicate openly and honestly with the citizens 
about the costs and benefits of alternative “just military preparedness” proposals. 
The defense budget should be transparent to the representatives. Guided by broad 
public input, they should allocate resources on the basis of careful balancing of the 
value of security against other governmental goals. Clearly, US military 
preparedness fails to satisfy these guidelines in several respects. Congressional 
representatives relentlessly push for military investments to keep jobs in their 
districts and please their campaign contributors, even beyond what the Pentagon 
might want (as illustrated by the budget fight over the F-22 Raptor aircraft).
xlv
 
Significant parts of the Pentagon budget are secret, including allocations for special 
operation forces. Weapons industries routinely have huge overruns and are a 
revolving door for politicians and military brass. And, the corporate media seldom 
question global US military presence. 
 The introduction of drone warfare illustrates how the United States fails in 
terms of the competent and right authority principle. The first combat drone, the 
Predator, was developed as a surveillance system and used as such in the Balkan wars 
in the mid-1990s. After 9/11, the Bush administration authorized the CIA to retrofit the 
Predator with Hellfire missiles and kill “high-value targets” of its own choosing, and in 
early 2002 this form of warfare was first executed. In short, drone warfare became 
deeply embedded in US counterinsurgency strategy before it came to public 
awareness. Similarly, it is not clear how far the Pentagon has traveled down to the road 
to robotic warfare and where it actually wants to go, but at least public concerns are 
being raised now. Perhaps in response, the Department of Defense issued a directive 
on “Autonomy in Weapon Systems” on November 21, 2012.xlvi A somewhat positive 
point is that the directive approves only the development of fully autonomous weapon 
systems with nonlethal capabilities, but the restriction is in effect for only five years 
and can be waived by top officials.
xlvii
 A clear negative point is that “semi-autonomous 
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weapon systems” with lethal capabilities are fully embraced. The dividing line 
between semi- and full autonomy is that humans in semi-autonomous systems must 
select the target that the systems pursue and destroy, and this line can be easily crossed 
once the R&D for semi-autonomous weapons systems has been completed.
xlviii
  
 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
 
In 2009, the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) called for a 
discussion to consider an international ban on autonomous weapon systems, and in 
2012, Human Rights Watch actually called for a ban. In April 2013, Christof Heyns, 
UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, wrote a 
comprehensive report on lethal autonomous robotics (LARs). He noted, “there is 
widespread concern that allowing LARs to kill people may denigrate the value of life 
itself.” Heyns called on all countries “to declare and implement national moratoria on 
at least the testing, production, assembly, transfer, acquisition, deployment and use of 
LARs until such time as an internationally agreed upon framework on the future of 
LARs has been established.”xlix And also in April 2013, a broad international coalition 
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) launched the Campaign to Stop Killer 
Robots. The proposal for a global ban on fully autonomous weapons is morally 
convincing and politically tenable. The moral risks involved in the use of these 
weapons are easy to recognize. Since the weapons are still in a state of development, 
we are not faced with the hard task of trying to turn back the clock, as a proposal to 
ban remote-controlled weaponized UAVs would imply. Indeed, the political tenability 
of “stop killer robots” is underlined by the fact that during the 2013 meeting of states 
party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), it was decided to organize 
a four-day meeting of experts in May 2014 on “lethal autonomous weapons systems.”l 
So should we forget about trying to ban our current combat drones? 
One major concern with our current combat drones is that they are a stepping 
stone to fully autonomous weapons. A ban of killer robots would take care of this 
concern. Another major worry is that our current combat drones enable targeted killing 
campaigns in nonwar zones. These campaigns violate international law,
li
 and so we 
may wish to call for a stricter enforcement of international law rather than a campaign 
to stop remote- control killing by drones. Still, for three reasons, we should continue to 
work toward banning our present combat drones. First, it is the case that killing by 
remote control makes it too easy to resort to war, enables alienated war, and places too 
few demands on its executioners. Second, it is not at all clear that calling for stricter 
international law enforcement will be successful. International law is fluid and the US 
drone campaigns seem to gradually create their own legal norms. Third, killing by 
drones is an affront to humanity, a form of killing that we should ban on this ground 
alone.
lii
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Robert Sparrow recently noted that “there is something inherently dishonorable 
about killing people one is observing on a video screen from thousands of kilometers 
away and who have no opportunity to return fire.” He adds, “[t]his is, I think, a 
widespread and powerful intuition but it turns out to be remarkably hard to unpack.”liii 
I agree on both scores, but let me nonetheless try to say a few words about what might 
be behind the intuition. There are several features of drone killing that raise moral 
concerns, but these features are shared with other weapons that don’t raise the same 
moral recoiling. Drone killing is risk-free killing, but in current modern warfare this is 
hardly a distinctive feature of drone killing. Due to US military superiority, pilots of 
manned planes run very few risks (other than mechanical failings and pilot errors), and 
unleashing cruise missiles from a ship is also virtually risk-free. Fighters killed by 
drones have no opportunity to return fire, but this is also true for cruise missiles. 
Similarly, militants killed by drones are not given an opportunity to surrender, but 
again, this is also true for cruise missiles. Drones have been criticized as fundamentally 
asymmetric weapons, giving no fighting chance to the enemy, but again this is not 
unique to drones: witness the utter destruction wrought by US aerial bombing 
campaigns. What is, however, distinctive about drones is that they are deadly 
surveillance platforms. The target is watched, sometimes for days on end, and then 
killed. Is it the power of being able to extinguish life at the moment of one’s choosing 
that is deeply morally disturbing here? That surely seems important, but the most 
morally disturbing feature is that in watching the militant to be killed, one is gradually 
watching a person to be killed. In other words, during the time of watching, the target 
turns from a threat into a human being, and then the kill becomes the kill of this human 
being. So, to come back to McMahan’s claim that the targeted killing of a militant is 
similar to killing a sleeping aggressor soldier, it should be noted that an attack at night 
when enemy soldiers are asleep might not be wrong, but to watch a soldier asleep for 
some time and experience his humanity rather than his hostile status, and then pull the 
trigger, is deeply wrong. To go after humanity instead of the threat is an affront to 
humanity, and this is what remote killing by drones often involves.
liv
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